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Evidence about the
Effectiveness of Public
Training Programs for
Incumbent Workers
A ublicly supported training for the
most part is provided to nonemployed
individuals. The Workforce Investment
Act (WIA) like its predecessors, the
Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA)
and Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act (CETA) targets public
training funds toward individuals having
difficulties becoming employed or facing
worker dislocation. The rationale for
this targeting is clear: shortening spells
of nonemployment is likely to reduce
public employment-conditioned transfer
payments and increase the efficiency of
the labor market. Furthermore, public
subsidies overcome human capital
investment borrowing constraints
that may be especially severe for
nonemployed individuals.
In addition to investments in job
training for nonemployed individuals,
the public also supports job training for
employed workers and has done so for
several years. One example of this type
of support is economic development
initiatives that include job training grants
aimed at business attraction or expansion.
These often take the form of customized
training contracts with community
or technical colleges for training the
workers who will be employed in

expanded or newly opened facilities.
More recently, for retention and
competitiveness reasons, states have
turned to the subsidization of incumbent
worker training. The dynamics of
economic change, especially the relative
shift away from manufacturing and
toward services, are leaving some
states with obsolete manufacturing
capacity and, often, relatively highly
paid dislocated workers who lack skills
or have high mobility costs that impede
their employment prospects. In response,
states are investing public funds in
training activities for existing workers to
try to retain businesses.
Estimates suggest that the private
sector invests approximately $50-$60
billion a year on training {Training 2006);
our own data suggest that only a small
fraction of this spending (less than $500
million, or about 1 percent) is publicly
subsidized. The purpose of this article
is to document this estimate and to
provide evidence about the social rate of
return on those investments. In fact, we
find the rate of return to be substantial,
suggesting that perhaps there is an
underinvestment in incumbent worker
training subsidization.
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics from Subsidized Employee Training Survey, by Year
Year
Characteristic
State spending ($, millions)
Total firms
Total workers trained
$/firm
$/worker
Workers trained/firm
Number of states reporting
Percent of U.S. population
Extrapolated total U.S. spendinga
($, millions)

2001
433.2
7,440
521,989
58,540
830
70.2
21
53.14
815.2

2002
367.4
9,018
540,331
40,732
680
59.9
23
55.54
661.5

2003
340.8
7,042
470,266
48,409
725
66.8
23
55.54
613.6

2004
324.3
7,793
477,047
41,630
680
61.2
22
54.88
590.9

Calculated as total state spending from the first row of the table divided by percent of U.S. population in the
eighth row.

State Investments in Incumbent
Worker Training
Moore et al. (2003) document a
total of 36 states that funded incumbent
worker training in 1998-99 with a total
budget of about $317.8 million. The U.S.
GAO (2004) surveyed all 50 states plus
the District of Columbia and found that
23 states used employer tax revenues
to fund "employment placement and
training programs" in 2002. Those states
reported spending $278 million on these
activities, of which $202 million was
on training. Note that these two sources
are not directly comparable because the
Moore et al. study refers to customized
training expenditures that may come
from any source of revenues, whereas the
U.S. GAO study focuses exclusively on
employer tax revenues.
In summer 2005, we surveyed all
states about incumbent worker training.
Thirty states responded, 22 of which
provided expenditure information. Those
22 states reported spending $324.3
million on incumbent worker training
in 2004. An extrapolation of this figure
on a population basis yields a national
estimate of approximately $591 million.
This figure is considerably larger
than either of the sources cited above,
but according to our survey, the total
spending had decreased every year for the
prior four years. Between 2001 and 2004,
there was a 30 percent decline. Table 1
shows that the annual levels of spending
on subsidized training in the responding
states fell from about $433 million to
$324 million (nominal dollars).

In all, our data suggest that states,
on average, fund about 200-300 firms
per year at a level of $40,000-$60,000
per firm for incumbent worker training.
The firms train 60-70 individuals, on
average. Of course, these averages mask
considerable variation across the states,
but we believe they give the reader a
sense of the types of subsidies in which
the states are engaging.
Massachusetts Workforce
Training Fund
Massachusetts has a program with
a scale that is close to the "typical"
state. In 1999, Massachusetts initiated
a competitive grant program to support
incumbent worker training. The
Massachusetts Workforce Training
Fund program is funded by an
employer contribution of 0.06 percent
on unemployment insurance taxable
wages (a maximum of $8.40 per year
per employee). In FY 2005, the program
distributed through a competitive
solicitation about $21.2 million to 209
companies to train 25,669 employees.
By regulation, the grants require a 100
percent match from companies and
may not exceed two years in length.

The Upjohn Institute was awarded a
contract to conduct an evaluation of the
Massachusetts Workforce Training Fund
Program. 1 This evaluation included site
visits to nine firms that had been awarded
grants and quantitative analyses of
administrative data. The administrative
data included information from the firms'
applications for the grant and from an
evaluation report that firms are required
to complete to get final payment when
their grants have ended.
Table 2 provides general descriptive
information about the grants that were
in the administrative data. The average
grant was just under $60,000, trained
about 100 workers, and lasted 18
months. On average, the grant supported
training costs of $1,284 per worker. In
the typical grant, the company's match
would be comprised of the employees'
wages during training, so those costs
would not be included in this figure. As
would be expected, these averages mask
considerable variation across firms.
What kinds of firms received
grants? Table 3 provides descriptive
information. Relative to the number
of employers in the private sector
economy, manufacturing employers
are overrepresented. Over 65 percent
of the grants have been awarded to
manufacturing firms, whereas only
14 percent of the state's private sector
firms are in manufacturing. The average
employment size of the firms was about
310, but it ranged from 2 to over 11,250.
About one-third of the grant recipients
have less than 50 employees, whereas
only about 12 percent have more than
500. The median employment size is
115. Just under 10 percent of the firms
with training grants were nonprofit
organizations, and about 9 percent were
unionized.
The evaluation study offers the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts several

Table 2 Characteristics of Grants
Characteristic

Average

Size of grant ($)
Employees trained
Grant length (days)
Cost/trainee ($)

59,294
100
549
1,284
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Table 3 Characteristics of Firms Receiving Grants
Characteristic
Industry
Food, textiles, apparel
Wood, paper, chemicals, plastic
Metal products, machines, electrical
Manufacturing, total
Retail: Books, music, general
Finance and insurance
Other services, except public admin.
All other
Nonmanufacturing, total
Union status
Unionized
Nonunion
Region
Central
Greater Boston
Northeast
Southeast
West
Profit status
Nonprofit
For profit
Ownership
Private
Public
Employment size, mean
administrative recommendations intended
to improve the efficiency and efficacy
of the program. In addition, as part of
our program evaluation, we estimate
rates of returns received by firms,
workers, and the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, which acts on the behalf
of its taxpayers. Using self-reported
data from the companies that received
grants, we calculate that workers receive
approximately a 5.4 percent return to
their participation in the training funded
by the state and their employer. Firms
received benefits in the form of profits
on the increased productivity of trained
workers and on the revenues received
from retained or expanded employment.
We estimate that their return was
approximately 16.6 percent on the
investments made with grant-matching
dollars.
Massachusetts received fiscal
benefits in the form of tax receipts from
expanded economic activity. In fact, we
approximate that since 1999, the state has
generated about 5,570 new or retained

Percentage
4.0
12.7
48.5
65.2
7.2
5.2
14.3
8.1
34.8

substantial and may indicate that states
are underinve sting.
Despite reaping substantial rates of
return, our survey of states suggests a
sharp decline in the level of funding for
such training.
More information on this project
may be found at http://www.commcorp
. org/researchandevaluation/pdf/
ResearchBrief4-08.pdf.
Note

8.7
91.3

1 . See Hollenbeck (2007) for a report on a
program evaluation of the Workforce Training Fund.

15.1
28.3
15.6
21.1
19.9

References

9.4
90.6
79.1
20.9
309.4

jobs, at a cost of about $8,750 per created
job. We estimate an increase in state
expenditures to support the population
growth engendered by the employment
growth. Netting this figure out of the
increase in state revenues yielded a fiscal
return of about 38.9 percent.
The estimated returns to workers,
firms, and the state have considerable
uncertainty associated with them because
rather broad assumptions were used in
developing the estimates, although we
attempted to be conservative in these
assumptions.
Summary
The evidence presented here implies
the following:
Public subsidy of incumbent worker
training, especially in export-based
firms, may be an effective economic
development tool for states.
The rates of return that accrue to
states for their training subsidies are
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Ann Markusen

Better Deals for State
and Local Economic
Development
This article highlights some key issues
discussed in the author s new book, Reining
in the Competition for Capital, which is
available now from the Upjohn Institute. Read
the first chapter at http://www.upjohninstitute
org.

JLn early 2007, North Carolina "won"
a $600 million Google server farm at
a cost of around $260 million in tax
abatements and grants by the state, the
city of Lenoir, and Caldwell County. The
city and county forgave 100 percent of
Google's business property taxes and
80 percent of its real estate taxes for
three decades, even though Google will
create only 210 jobs, many of which
require advanced degrees that only a
fraction of current residents possess. In

Effective economic development
requires strenuous reforms
to produce good, long-term jobs
and improve efficiency
and equity in the process.
negotiating the deal, Google demanded
that lawmakers keep its name secret from
the public, even from residents who were
asked to sell their homes and properties
for the project.
This case is typical of heightened
global incentive competition in which
companies face off against state and
local governments in a "market for
jobs." Increasingly, state governors and
local mayors in countries as diverse as
Australia, Brazil, and India are being
pressed for similarly large grants and
tax breaks under conditions of minimal
transparency and where governments
lack expertise to make good deals.
And in large metro areas, similarly
huge sums are bid to influence where
low-wage retailers like Wal-Mart and

Cabela's locate, with no net benefit to
the region and negative consequences for
existing smaller retailers.
Are incentives good, bad, or a mixed
bag, and how do we know? In Reining
in the Competition for Capital, top U.S.
scholars and practitioners working on this
issue explore the reasoning, evidence,
and practice under incentive competition.
Though working from disparate
disciplines and points of view, all oppose
either banning incentives altogether
or continuing with the status quo.
Rather, we argue, effective economic
development requires strenuous reforms
to produce good, long-term jobs and
improve efficiency and equity in the
process.

The Reasoning
There are three schools of thought
regarding incentive competition. One
school, stated succinctly by Burstein and
Rolnick (1995), argues that incentives
are both inefficient (they transfer
consumer surplus to firms that would
locate there anyway and interfere with
optimal siting) and inequitable (they
impose tax and public service burdens
on existing firms and residents). This
camp proposes that Congress tax away
all such incentives, rendering them
ineffective. Another school, an analogue
to the famous Tiebout hypothesis about
fiscal competition among fragmented
local governments, argues that the status
quo is efficient and should be left as is. 1
The intricate logic of these positions is
explored in the Markusen and Nesse and
Thomas chapters of the book.
A third school of thought argues that
in an integrating world economy where
central governments are devolving
responsibility for economic development

Available now from the
W.E. Upjohn Institute:

Reining in the
Competition
for Capital
Ann Markusen, Editor

Chapter 1: Ann Markusen and
Katherine Nesse, "Institutional
and Political Determinants of
Incentive Competition"
Chapter 2: Kenneth P. Thomas,
"The Sources and Processes of
Tax and Subsidy Competition"
Chapter 3: Peter Fisher, "The
Fiscal Consequences of
Competition for Capital"
Chapter 4: Adinda Sinnaeve,
"How the EU Manages Subsidy
Competition"
Chapter 5: Timothy J. Bartik,
"Solving the Problems of
Economic Development
Incentives"
Chapter 6: Rachel Weber,
"Negotiating the Ideal Deal:
Which Local Governments Have
the Most Bargaining Leverage?"
Chapter 7: William Schweke,
"Do Better Job Creation
Subsidies Hold Real Promise for
Business Incentive Reformers?"
Chapter 8: Greg LeRoy,
"Nine Concrete Ways to Curtail
the Economic War among the
States"
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Figure 1 Corporate Income Tax as a Percent of Total State Tax Revenue, 1975-2005
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SOURCE: Data prior to 1991 from U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
(1992, p. 120); data for 1991-2005 from U.S. Census Bureau (2006).

onto lower-level governments, often
without the resources to do so effectively,
we have no choice but to champion state
and local governments' rights to shape
their relatively open economies. Bartik,
in his chapter, argues that increasing local
employment can yield substantial net
social benefits, especially if jobs go to
existing local residents, if costs of serving
incentivized businesses is less than the
new revenues they generate, and if no
better uses of public resources are on the
horizon.
But the market for jobs and tax
base is rife with failures, the authors
in this collection say. Multilocational
companies, the suppliers of jobs, control
crucial information in the deal-making
process and have greater power in
bilateral negotiations. Through the
remarkable rise of site consultancy as an
intermediating institution, Markusen and
Nesse argue, they are able to informally
collaborate in extracting spending and
tax breaks, while the public sector agents
bidding for jobs are unable or are too
intimidated to share information with
each other. The result is a strong bias
toward overestimating benefits, according
to Bartik. Furthermore, the flurry over
deal making obscures a longer-term
erosion in the business share of public

sector revenues and often impoverishes
"winning" local governments' future
operating budgets, especially if firms fail
or decamp in a short time for even lowercost locations.

cost of nearly $40,000 per job (Luger
and Bae 2005; Schweke chapter). In a
pioneering study of 366 Ohio expansions
between 1993 and 1995, Gabe and
Graybill (2002) find that those receiving
incentives overannounced employment
targets but created no new jobs (in fact,
reduced overall jobs), while those that
did not receive incentives accurately
forecast their job expansion and did
create new jobs. Studying the extent to
which incentives create jobs for existing
residents, Bartik (1993) finds that in the
long run, about 80 percent of new jobs in
local economies go to outsiders.
The corporate income tax share of
state revenues, Fisher's chapter shows,
has dropped by 40 percent between 1980
and recent years (Figure 1), an erosion
he attributes largely to rising incentives
and related changes in taxation practices
aimed at competitiveness. As a result, a
larger share of the public sector service
burden, including that provided to firms, is
borne by households in the form of sales
and property taxes. Since these are highly
regressive taxes, the net result is to shift
the tax burden from the highest income
households to the lowest (Table 1).
Reforming the Market for Jobs

The Evidence

The authors document many
encouraging experiments for improving
incentive competition currently in place
as well as reform proposals for federal,
state, and local levels. Sinnaeve, a top
regulator of incentive competition at the
European Commission, explains lucidly
how the EU system of deterrence works.
EU members are prohibited from giving
incentives to firms except under certain
circumstances and only then if they

There are few long-term studies or
data with which to evaluate promised
jobs and tax base increments envisioned
in deals of the past, but hard-hitting
analyses are emerging. A path-breaking
analysis of a recent North Carolina
economic development initiative
involving more than $ 1 billion in public
sector liabilities found that only 4
percent of the jobs created were actually
induced by the program at an exorbitant

Table 1 State and Local Taxes as Shares of Family Income

1989
2002
Change (%)

Lowest 20%

Second
20%

Middle
20%

Fourth
20%

10.2
11.4
+1.2

9.4
10.3
+0.8

8.8
9.6
+0.7

8.4
8.8
+0.4

Top
20%
7.5
7.3
-0.1

Top
1%
5.5
5.2
-0.3

NOTE: Tax burdens are shown after the federal offset; that is, these are the net burdens on families
after taking into account the deductibility of state and local taxes on federal returns for those who
itemize (generally higher-income taxpayers).
SOURCE: Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (2003, pp. 118-119).
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apply to the Commission for permission.
The exceptions involve less-developed
regions, which may offer certain types
of incentives for training, research, and
technology, for instance to encourage
new plants and offices. The EU system
largely deters governments from bidding
wars for existing plants, because under
most circumstances, they would simply
not be permitted. While the regulatory
process is expensive, it restrains
tremendous distortions and giveaways
in business sitings worth many times its
cost.
In the United States, many state
and local governments have designed
reporting requirements that raise
transparency in bargaining and awards.
Others have pioneered performance
requirements in written contracts, often
with penalties and repayment provisions.
Weber, in her chapter, explores many of
these and shows how they enable public
sector economic developers, like good
customers in any market, to get a better
deal. She shows that some governments
plan in advance what they want and
are prepared for sudden requests and
bidding wars, invest their public dollars
in place-based assets rather than firmbased ones, and extend benefits only
after firms have produced the jobs they
promise. Clawbacks requirements that
firms that renege on contracts pay back
some or all of the incentives and job
quality standards are increasingly being
incorporated into deals, as is school board
input on abatements and tax increment
financing (the devotion of future tax
revenue from increased property values
to paying off bonds for improvements).
Incentive reform is a big and
incremental project at local, state, and
federal levels. Sunshine, claims LeRoy
in his chapter, is the best antiseptic. He
reviews the 12 states that already have
some form of incentive disclosure, a few
of those Virginia, Maine, and North
Carolina include corporate income tax
breaks. He also recommends disclosing
state taxes paid to corporate shareholders.
LeRoy argues that the adoption of state
unified development budgets would
enable citizens and decision makers to
see the combination of spending and tax
expenditures involved in all programs,

as a public interest group in Kentucky
has pioneered for their state (Mountain
Associates for Community Economic
Development 2005). Markusen and Nesse
and LeRoy recommend legally defining
site consultants as lobbyists, blocking
success fees that tend to escalate deal
dollars, and ending dual agency and other
practices that exacerbate market failures.
States can also restrain the
contribution of incentives to sprawl.
To curtail the economic war among the
suburbs for retail, LeRoy recommends
that states ban retail subsidies altogether
except in depressed inner-city markets
that are demonstrably underserved.
The federal government could
considerably moderate incentive
competition by creating federal carrots
against job piracy. LeRoy notes that
federal program funding has been held

To curtail the economic war
among the suburbs for retail,
states could ban retail subsidies
altogether except in depressed
inner-city markets that are
demonstrably underserved.
up to induce states to raise legal drinking
ages and implement school reform. A
share of economic development funding
from the Federal Departments of
Commerce and Labor could be held until
states adopted certain reforms.
Overall, these seminal papers respond
to a growing crisis in state and local
finance, where high-profile recruitments
cost community too much for the jobs
created, or worse, leave them holding
the debt bag when firms fail to perform.
State and local responsibility for
economic development is a growing
reality everywhere in the world, and
incentives are among the most powerful
tools available. Like any market, this one
would benefit from clearer information
and a more level playing field. The
authors in Reining in the Competition for
Capital present models, evidence, and
doable reforms that can help public sector
economic developers accomplish that
within the decade.

1. Tiebout (1956) argues that local governments
in a metropolitan area compete to offer packages
of public services at the best tax "price," thus
optimally allocating resources when residents "vote
with their feet" in choosing where to live.
Ann Markusen is a professor in the urban and
regional planning graduate program and director of
the Project on Regional and Industrial Economics,
Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of
Minnesota.
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